Change and a Changing World? Theorizing Morphogenic Society by Morgan, JA
Change and a Changing World? Theorising Morphogenic Society  
 
Jamie Morgan 
Leeds Beckett University, UK 
 
Generative Mechanisms: Transforming the Social Order. By Margaret S. Archer, 
editor. London, Springer, 2015. Pp. 248. ISBN 978 3 319 13772 8 (hbk) £90  
 
Abstract: In the following review essay I provide some background in order to 
place Archer’s edited Volume 3 text Generative Mechanisms in the context of the 
series from which it derives - From Morphostasis to Morphogenesis. In doing so I 
provide some sense of the significance of the series. Thereafter, I provide an 
overview of the key substantive claims of the essays, with some comment on how 
they may be linked together in terms of the theme of the series. 
 
Keywords Morphogenic Society, morphogenesis, morphostasis, generative 
mechanism, late modernity    
 
It is always difficult to do justice to an edited text in the few thousand words of a 
review essay. Despite a common theme the papers will each follow different 
strands based on the interests and proclivities of the authors. One then often faces 
the challenge of being even more reductive than usual in attempting to present the 
material. This problem is compounded when the edited text forms part of a series, 
since the whole then has its own significant genealogy and chain of reference 
points internal to that series. Under the circumstances it is difficult to do more 
than give the reader a sense of why (if at all) she should actually progress from 
reading the review essay to reading the text(s). However, sometimes, the process 
is easier than others and this is the case with the work set out here. Archer’s 
Generative Mechanisms is Volume 3 of a projected series of 5 volumes arising from 
the annual ‘From Modernity to Morphogenesis’ workshops of the Centre for Social 
Ontology. In the following essay I provide some background in order to place 
Volume 3 in context, and also to provide some sense of the significance of the 
series. Thereafter, I provide an overview of the key substantive claims of the 
essays, with some comment on how they may be linked together in terms of the 
theme of the series.  
 
By way of background 
 
Each volume in this series is intended to focus on a different aspect of what the 
contributors consider a key challenge for contemporary theory. Change is 
inherent to the social world, but this is different to the possibility of a changing 
world. That is, a social world may be one whose varieties, relations and rates of 
change are such that the social world does not simply include change but is 
constituted and challenged through change. Change would then have resulted in 
transformation to a new kind of social formation (defined by change). Many 
theorists and commentators have in the last twenty years begun to orient on this 
notion of a changing world through such concepts as liquid modernity.1 A sense 
                                                        
1 See, Albrow, 1997; Bauman, 2000; Braidotti, 2013  
that everything is in a state of flux has, for example, lent itself at the extreme to 
claims that the social world has de-structured, that culture has broken free of 
constraints or points of reference, to become no more than (perhaps liberating) 
portable internalised and radically variable performances, which in turn shape or 
call forth an individual as a source of self-validating, fluid, self-constructing 
identity, constantly shifting through a radically uncertain social terrain. In 
drawing back from this extreme a changing world is still widely recognized as one 
creating new and profound issues for who we are, how we live, and whether in 
fact the way we live is rendering societies unstable and perhaps even 
unsustainable (due to social cleavage, fragmentation and disintegration, as well as 
due to the environmental implications of capitalist societies in chains of 
industrialised and consumer oriented economies).  
Here, there is clearly an empirical challenge to be met. Theory has not 
simply manufactured a problematic.2 We live in a time of frequent reference to 
crisis, but also of continual reporting of technological transformations and 
attendant shifts in social practice, combined with a constant chatter regarding the 
imminent potentials arising from those new social practices and technologies. 
Familiar positive themes include social media as a new way to foster and integrate 
participatory democracy, the sharing-reciprocal potentials of a wired world and 
of a new kind of economy not rooted in old ownership and control systems, and 
the potentials for long healthy lives created by imminent breakthroughs in 
medical technologies.3 Familiar negative themes include the dark side of the 
digital world (pervasive access to pornography and its effects on sexuality and 
expectations), the increasing medicalization of being (a chemical for every 
condition and problem), the effects of financialisation on the person, society, and 
economy, the development of disaggregated networks and organizational chains 
of corporations (creating problems of growing income inequality, and at the 
extreme forced labour, as well as tax avoidance and other social ills – enhancing 
the power and the privilege of the few, and oppressing the many, even as societies 
may be in some senses ‘developing’), and, most recently, ‘Big Data’, as well as the 
imminent introduction of ‘artificial intelligence’ (or at least algorithmic learning 
systems) in tandem with advances in robotics, which seem set to make human 
labour redundant in yet another swathe of occupations.4 
Change or continual prominent processes of change are increasingly 
recognized as our normal. The way in which change is recognized involves 
contradictions and confusion, but a consistent theme is that the rate of change has, 
seemingly, increased.5 However, orienting on change creates immediate 
problems. Who is this ‘we’ for whom ‘our’ new normal is identified (how pervasive 
and universal are given changes for persons and across geographies)? 
Concomitantly, what is change? How is it to be differentiated from what does not 
                                                        
2 See Patomaki, 2008 
3 For example, Khondker, 2011  
4 For example, Seabrooke and Wigan, 2014; Morgan 2009; Morgan & Sheehan, 2015 
5 For example, are we living in a digital age, which is increasingly tailored to us, or are we being 
Taylorized; are we becoming infantilized by technologies to which we delegate more of our 
existence or are we being augmented (where does power lie in a cyborg society)? Note, drawing 
attention to differing discursive positions here is not to suggest that the modern world is simply 
significant in terms of the digital, the technological etc. in these terms – merely that these are terms 
in which it has been discussed.   
change – how is it identified? How is it to be accounted for, including in its relation 
to what, seemingly, has not changed?  
That the social world is in given places and for groups of people in some 
sense different does not mean that the social world is profoundly changed (or is 
now defined by change). One may simply be observing new patterns in events, and 
similar processes may be giving rise to superficial differences. Moreover, our 
sense of change may be impressionistic – selecting only that which seems new and 
attributing to it greater significance and generality than might be justified. The 
difference in difference, the newness beyond superficial novelty, and the 
pervasiveness of what we consider prominent may all be contingent and may all 
be contested. There is a potential here to commit a variety of errors – broadly, a 
form of empiricism (inferring from and theorising at the level of events), and, 
more narrowly, a form of technological determinism (albeit one curiously future 
directed and claiming to radically relativise activity). As such, exploring the 
empirical prominence of ‘change’ and conceptualising the nature and significance 
of that change necessarily requires caution. The apparent significance of change, 
therefore, creates grounds for scepticism. This is not least because in the world of 
academia prominent change tends to induce a rush to theorise and comment (to 
stake a claim to the future). This is how careers are made.  
A key underlying motivation of the ‘From Modernity to Morphogenesis’ 
series is precisely to introduce a note of caution based on the observation of this 
induced academic response. In general, the increasing recognition of change has 
not just created a key challenge for contemporary theory, but has resulted in 
forms of theory that must be challenged – the Network society, the Information 
Society, the Risk Society etc. For the contributors to the series, there has been a 
tendency to pass quickly from the observation of apparently increasing change to 
the claim that there has been a transition to a state of change, and of a new social 
formation based on this state of change. This is a potential empirical and 
theoretical error. It is the academic analogue of the policy practice of claiming the 
old rules no longer apply, that this time is different – often just before reality bites 
back. In economic context consider, for example, the hubris of the dot.com boom 
or the Great Moderation.6    
It is from the point of view of an ontological realism that a further note of 
scepticism is introduced. Orienting on change can quickly descend to the claim 
that everything is change, and this in turn can lead quickly to conceptualisations 
freed from the bounds of ontological plausibility. The consequence is that 
theoretical novelty replaces the more guarded claim that even change is rooted in 
the possibilities and potentials of social reality. One can transform society but one 
cannot exceed reality, despite that transformation may have emergent 
properties.7 Change is a process. It may well be one that is shifting towards a social 
                                                        
6 See Morgan, 2013. 
7 If one accepts the concept of emergence then it becomes the case that a new power or 
characteristic within a new relational form may arise. As such, one might superficially argue that 
the non-reducibility and non-predictability of the new means that this given new x could be of a 
kind that exceeds reality as known. However, the counter-argument is that to exceed reality as 
known requires the new form, which creates the conditions that exceed the prior reality, do so 
relationally, and so the new form remains subject to possibility based on the generalised 
characteristics of relationality for the given form. Therefore, in so far as it is adequately expressed 
in social ontology then social reality has not been exceeded but rather elaborated (requiring for 
example, the powers of particulars and the analytical distinctions in social activity and interaction 
formation of a qualitatively different type, but this cannot be taken for granted 
merely because ‘more’ change is being observed. One needs to adequately 
conceptualise the nature of change, and this includes the possible generative 
mechanisms that may make sense of any possible qualitatively different social 
formation. If one cannot provide a causal account of what is and has changed, then 
one cannot discount that it is no more than a contingent and transient set of 
patterns in events. That is, unless there is no longer any such thing as cause, and 
transience is what society has become – which would be a circular validation 
based on a set of conditions that if one gives them serious consideration violate 
the very possibility of human and social existence. 
It is with such considerations in mind that the series based on the 
workshops ‘From Modernity to Morphogenesis’ can be said to have a clear 
purpose and unifying theme, as well as considerable significance or importance. 
The contributors (working in collaboration at the workshops though then 
authoring the essays singly or in pairs) begin from the acknowledgement that the 
growing recognition of change (caveats notwithstanding) and the concerns of 
many social theorists (errors of inference not withstanding) are indicative that 
change is in some sense more rapid and significant within modernity. Modernity 
is perhaps now late modernity, and (since late rather than latest), may be 
approaching some form of transitiontransformation. The series then is rooted 
in two guarded questions: 
 
1. Does the observation of change warrant the claim that we live in a period 
where change is leading to a changing social world, which in turn 
constitutes a new social form?  
2. How can this changing social world (including the issues of transition its 
realisation may involve) be theorised; what are the specifics of its social 
ontology?  
 
The opening paragraph of Volume 1 of the series clearly articulates the group’s 
position: 
 
In itself, rapid social change does not necessarily signal, much less 
constitute, a new type of social formation. What intrigues us is whether or 
not this increasingly important process could be responsible for generating 
a different kind of social formation – Morphogenic Society – albeit one with 
the potential for assuming a multiplicity of specific forms. None of us is 
committed to announcing the advent of the Morphogenic Society, but 
regard it as worth exploring. All of us are wary about the array of social 
forms that have hastily been advanced as superseding modernity. Thus, we 
do not precipitously announce a new ‘Beyond’.8   
 
To be clear, the purpose of the series, and thus also Volume 3, is not to announce 
a qualitatively new social formation and to define precisely what this is. Rather it 
is to consider what it may be, based on onto-analytical and empirical explorations 
of the contemporary world. The chosen term for the possible arising social 
                                                        
– see later). The argument, of course, is circular and heavily dependent on the adequacy of the 
social ontology as a generalised expression of the potentials of reality. 
8 Archer, 2013: p. 1 in Archer, editor, 2013 
formation is the Morphogenic Society. The term immediately invokes a given 
general meaning, if only for semantic coherence: morph and genic – change that is 
produced. As such, the Morphogenic Society’s coherent and anticipated general 
point of reference is as a social form (or range of forms) in which it is processes of 
morphogenesis rather than morphostasis that significantly dominate the totality 
of that social formation, as well as many of its component parts. In Volume 1, 
Archer also adds as possibilities: 
 
[A] social order governed increasingly by positive feedback, where change 
accelerates exponentially and whose distinctive process is for ‘variety to 
stimulate more variety’… [A social order which may involve] heterogeneity 
at all levels in all domains… [and some degree of] stabilization-without-
stasis [since otherwise it would be disordered, and detrimentally 
disintegrated in a way prone to chaotic dissolution].9   
 
Thereafter, given the claimed socio-historical conjuncture from within which the 
exploration takes place, the series as a project is necessarily situated as 
speculative. It is a focus on tendencies and potentials within what has not yet and 
may not ever become. To a large degree it deals with the same observed 
phenomena as many of the theories it contests (new social practices, 
organizations, technologies etc), but does so in the context of ontology and of their 
role in generative mechanisms (as incomplete processes). Speculative is, 
therefore, positioned more in the form of tentativeness regarding inferences and 
claims. The whole point of the project is to avoid claiming too much on the basis 
of generalising from observed changes in and through theorisations that 
simultaneously place change at their centre. To do so would be to presuppose what 
it is that is supposed to be under investigation. The contributors are formally 
collectively committed to avoiding reading too much into observed events and 
practices at the level of those events and practices. Again, the claim set out in 
Volume 1 is that:         
 
No one has yet advanced or is married to a theory of the coming 
Morphogenic Society. Instead… we try to anticipate the criteria such a 
theory would have to meet; the objections and alternatives it would have 
to overcome. At most, explicit speculations are ventured about the 
possibility of this social formation. However, we still live in the crisis of 
later modernity, a formation that appears to be gasping without any 
guarantee that this is its last gasp. Rather, we focus on the process of ‘social 
morphogenesis’ because only if we can articulate a generative mechanism 
of social change is there any convincing basis for beginning to theorise 
about radical social transformation.10    
 
This last sentence indicates a further motivating aspect of the project. If the social 
world involves significant generative mechanisms, and humans are central to the 
potentials of the social world, then the future is neither deterministically 
condemned to dystopian outcomes nor simply a matter of senseless events in flux. 
                                                        
9 Archer, 2013: pp. 12, 14, 18 
10 Archer, 2013: p. 2 in Archer, editor, 2013 
One choice is not as good as another as though in the end no choice matters. What 
we do matters, but a constructive approach to the future begins from an adequate 
account of where we are (which acknowledges and contributes to our reflexive 
potential). There is, therefore, a normative dynamic to an interest in the 
Morphogenic Society, and then also an additional normative qua emancipatory 
commitment in terms of theorising possible forms of a Morphogenic Society. This 
is clearly summarised in Archer’s introduction to Volume 3: 
 
The aim is to answer the transcendental question: What needs to be the 
case to make a Morphogenic society – as a wholly new global social 
formation [emphasis added] – possible? One response we have rejected in 
the three volumes published to date is the mere presence of plentiful 
morphogenetic change representing more variety and (in principle) more 
opportunity. There are three main reasons for rejecting this formula [as 
sufficient - note the previous quotation from Volume 1 regarding the 
minima for a Morphogenic Society ]: 
 
Variety and opportunity can be concentrated in very few hands, leaving 
most hands empty on a new but steeper gradient of inequality, which is 
fundamentally unstable.     
At least as many variants of Morphogenic societies are conceivable as there 
are multiple forms of late modernity. 
Many of these variants would fare very badly if assessed as providing the 
conditions for a good life for all. However, such outcomes are not inevitable 
and neither are we ethically neutral about them. (Archer, 2015: p. 21) 
 
So, one might note that though cautious and formally sceptical regarding the rush 
to proclaim an already realised new social formation, the project is also one that 
is considerably bolder in terms of its commitment to articulating or working 
towards a particular quality for any future Morphogenic Society.  Specifically the 
normative form of the transcendental question posed is, ‘What needs to be the 
case to make a eudemonic Morphogenic society possible?’ (Archer, 2015: p. 21). 
Since, the future is yet to be written there is nothing intrinsically contradictory 
about this combination of the bold and cautious. One might argue the reverse, it is 
entirely consistent to attempt to theorise the characteristics one would prefer in 
the society that may arise (in so far as these are within the possibilities and 
potentials of social reality). Concomitantly one might argue that it is on the basis 
of characteristics that have eudemonistic qualities that a society could be varying 
without being disintegrated, changing without becoming dysfunctional to the 
point of disorder, and stable without stasis.11 This, however, is not the main 
subject of Volume 3 and is intended to be the subject of the final Volume 5. 
  
The main point to make here is that the series as a whole has a unifying theme, a 
set of orienting questions, a genuine observed empirical set of phenomena to 
consider, and a further significance as an intervention, in so far as the whole is 
                                                        
11 For these reasons a eudemonistic Morphogenic Society is also referred to as a ‘concrete utopia’ 
or ‘win-win’ situation for its participants. See Archer, editor, 2013: p. 12. 
differentiated from an identified contemporary tendency to overstate the degree 
to which we are already living in radically new times.  
 
Morphogenesis, morphostasis, structure, agency and culture (SAC) 
 
Though the concept of a Morphogenic Society is an open question to be explored 
in the series, in so far as the contributors are committed to seeking generative 
mechanisms that may give rise to that society, they are committed to a general 
approach to social ontology. The language of that social ontology pervades and 
informs much of the work. This is not to suggest the contributors lack diversity in 
terms of their specific positions, emphases and interests, nor that they approach 
a general position without critique.12 But it is to note that the point of departure 
is first a commitment to the significance and value of social ontology as a means 
of inquiry, and second of a particular social ontological approach as the initial 
medium, at least as the initial language or terminology, of that inquiry  (subject 
then to critical scrutiny and development). Much of the language of this derives 
from the work of Archer.13   
 Though Archer is a social theorist, and her work in general can be 
described as social theory, she also differentiates it in terms of its level of 
generality and purpose. She refers to critical realism as social ontology meta-
theory, and her own general ontological schema as a complementary 
methodological approach in the social domain, which more substantive and 
focused work can then translate into particular explanatory endeavours and 
developments of more specific theorizations. Her approach breaks the social 
world down into possible morphostatic and morphogenetic cycles, working on 
and through different yet variously connected, related and interacting, 
components and aspects of social reality, each with its own powers and potentials. 
Following from a critical realist ontology she maintains a distinction between 
agency and structure, and based on her own work argues for a distinction between 
culture and structure. The three constitute what she refers to as SAC.  She 
conceives structure to have its own variety of causation. Structure relationally 
positions humans as agents who take on roles in terms of a variety of 
organizations. Humans have particular powers that make possible the structures 
of relations in which they are positioned. However, the human cannot simply be 
reduced to the existence of any given set of positions (as a multiply socialised 
agent). The particular powers of the human that make possible such agency also 
mean that the human is more than the sum of such agency – she is an always 
potentially reflexive and deliberative source of personal projects (which may 
often operate on and through formally recognized organizationally positioned 
agency – her sum is more than the parts in terms of which she may be active). 
Culture provides a concomitant domain to structure and consists in an 
accumulated stock of ideas and artefacts.14 SAC then provides the initial 
                                                        
12 For example, Porpora, 2016 (forthcoming); Donati, 2011; Lawson, 2003; Wight, 2006; 
Hofkirchner, 2013 
13 Notably Archer, 1995, 2000, 2003, 2012 
14 More specifically it is the ‘intelligibilia’ of society that requires hermeneutic interpretation – the 
cumulative product of human ‘mentation’: books, theories, ideologies and also the interpretive 
dynamic of use of concept-dependent artefacts. It can be sought in our actions, ‘our heads’, but also 
as stocks that can be accessed for interpretation –libraries, museums etc.  
terminology for the domains and components of morphostatic and morphogenetic 
cycles (Archer’s M/M approach).            
Time, or rather processes engaged in time, is central to Archer’s work. A 
morphostatic cycle is one that tends through its constituent parts to preserve or 
maintain the form (the relational whole) that is undergoing the cycle.15 A 
morphogenetic cycle is one that in some significant sense elaborates, and thus to 
potentially differing degrees qualitatively and quantitatively changes, through its 
constituent parts, the form that is undergoing the cycle. ‘Through its constituent 
parts’ implies only that the form is operated on by the interactions of its parts. 
Relevant parts (aspects of structures, agents qua agency, culture etc) are also 
reproduced or changed in the processes in which they engage (there is a ‘double’ 
effect). A cycle in general consists in a temporal sequence of conditioning, 
interaction and set of consequences (the relative morphostasis or 
morphogenesis).16 For example, Figure 1 sets out a morphogenetic cycle: 
 
Figure 1: Morphogenetic cycles 
 
CULTURAL DOMAIN                   STRUCTURAL DOMAIN 
 
      Cultural conditioning  Structural conditioning 
        T1     T1 
 
              Socio-Cultural interaction         Social interaction 
            T2        T3                T2               T3 
 
                      Cultural elaboration  Structural elaboration 
           T4                         T4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cycles are not hermetic. New cycles constantly follow from prior ones, and 
multiple cycles involving different foci may be occurring simultaneously and non-
synchronically. The M/M approach is then no more or less than a generalised 
methodological way to map out or temporally sequence for investigation the 
different possible components in social interaction. Quite how one goes on to 
conceive the components, the domains, the cut–off points and interactions 
between periods in a cycle, and how one differentiates within and between cycles, 
and what judgement one comes to regarding the consequences of said cycles, can 
be contested. It is this contestation that, through the three volumes so far 
available, forms the basis of argument in regard of the possibility of a Morphogenic 
Society.  
                                                        
15 The original language of morphogenesis in the social sciences derives from Buckley, 1967 
16 Morphostasis will tend to involve negative feedback loops and morphogenesis positive feedback 
loops.  
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For Archer in particular, it is in terms of exploring developments at three 
levels of emergence that the possibility of a Morphogenic Society can be most 
appropriately pursued through the M/M approach:17  
 
1. A focus on the internal dynamics of a given M/M cycle. That is, a focus on 
tracing the initial cultural and structural features from a given prior cycle 
for some substantive area of inquiry, and how these features act as grounds 
which form the basis of a new cycle from which morphostasis or 
morphogenesis may arise.   
2. A focus on the relation of relations between M/M cycles in different 
substantive areas of inquiry. That is, between institutional forms, such as 
the family, economy, polity etc. Such meso-institutional relations may 
exhibit complementarities or incompatibilities that are significant for the 
ongoing co-existence of those substantive areas, and may then influence 
the M/M cycles of those areas.   
3. A focus on the degree of congruity and incongruity between structure and 
culture, particularly in terms of the more general features of culture and 
structure writ-large.  That is, a focus on whether culture and structure are 
in some sense acting to mutually reinforce tendencies in each, creating 
further M/M effects.  
 
In pursuing these foci Archer also explores different ‘situational logics of action’ 
that arise and shape agency, and she distinguishes between primary agents (the 
individual) and corporate agents (those collectively organized in pursuit of given 
aims). She places significant emphasis on the particular powers of the human as 
central to social reality. Unlike a natural or biological system, every significant 
element of social reality is subject to the subject – it cannot always and 
everywhere be assumed to be reproduced automatically or mechanistically. Even 
morphostasis requires work. Moreover, in terms of the potential for a 
Morphogenic Society, as particular changes occur then the scope for reflexivity 
and deliberation, in ways that foster further variety, may also increase. If there is 
less scope in particular, and then as a general situation because of the particulars, 
for key elements of life to become subject to routines, then variety may well foster 
more variety, as agency becomes conditioned to elaboration rather than 
reproduction as its way of engaging with the world. This does not render activity 
free floating or absent power and interests, but rather may operate through the 
power of given groups, and may do so in ways that influence and are influenced 
                                                        
17 Since relations, connections, causations, processes etc. are part of a multi-form social reality one 
should emphasise that the distinctions made are analytic (regarding aspects which can be 
distinguished and are in various ways different, though related and mutually referenced). The 
distinctions are to facilitate clarity in investigation and explanation. One should not read into 
Archer’s methodology an attempt to foster a reification of parts of a whole, but rather view it as a 
series of foci where other aspects are kept in mind. Reification, overly schematic distinctions etc 
would be an error of inference by the critic or an error of application by the user, rather than an 
error reducible to the formulation of the whole, based on the intent of Archer (see Archer, editor, 
2015: p. 10 fn. 12). Archer also emphasises – in response to possible misinterpretation – that 
morphostatic and morphogenetic cycles are not ‘pure’ in then sense of each is defined by the 
absence of characteristics of the other (see Archer, editor, 2013, and also Archer, 2015: p. 137 in 
Archer, editor, 2015).   
 
by the degree to which society is integrated (is cohesive in its structural and 
cultural aspects), and the system at large is also similarly integrated.  
Hence, a Morphogenic Society may be incipient in the way in which agency 
is changing (including the degree and types of reflexivity deployed), and in the 
way corporate agents are organizing and technology and social practices are being 
developed in ways significant in and between given institutions.18 Other 
contributors to the series take up this language and approach to differing degrees, 
and take the whole in different directions. They do so in Volume 3 based on the 
specific problematic posed for the workshop on which it is based. Porpora’s work 
in particular is most closely aligned with Archer’s, though the work of all of the 
others resonates to differing degrees (she has for example, also worked closely 
with Donati on relational sociology, Tony Lawson is a founding member of the 
Centre for Social Ontology, John Latsis and Ismael Al-Amoudi are members along 
with Lawson of the Cambridge Social Ontology Group, and Philip Gorski has done 
much to promulgate critical realism within US sociology).19 
 
Volume 3: the nature of a generative mechanism and the potentials of 
current multiple causation in the social world 
 
Volume 3 is split into three parts. Part 1 provides an under-labouring or 
clarification function for the concept of generative mechanism and hence of 
causation. This is deemed important because the concept of generative 
mechanism has recently been revived across the social sciences, and this may 
create some confusion in terms of the use and meaning of the term. The possibility 
of confusion is considered significant because the point of departure of the project 
is the possible generative mechanisms for a Morphogenic Society (and, as I have 
set out, it is on this basis the whole was originally justified and differentiated from 
prior theory in Volume 1).  Part 2 is focused on exploring some possible generative 
mechanisms with an emphasis on what is seemingly new (and with an emphasis 
on some – so, not the only or not exclusively significant generative mechanisms). 
Archer, in particular, makes the point that in the context of the temporal dynamics 
of M/M cycles current processes might most appropriately be construed as within 
T2  T3 (see previous figure).20 Processes are incomplete. Part 3 provides some 
nuance to argument regarding the nature of change. Specifically, contributors 
consider in different ways how change may be situated to what has not changed, 
within and for M/M cycles.    
 
The concept of a generative mechanism begins from Bhaskar’s disarmingly 
minimal claim that it is ‘the way of acting of a thing’. A ‘way of acting’ is however, 
a focus on how rather than simply that something occurs. It requires a specific 
account of operation, which places the roots of explanation at the level of 
causation created by the powers of the identified real ‘things’. It is these that give 
rise to events. So, a focus on generative mechanisms is understood as a focus on 
the causal operation of relevant significant ‘things’. It resists a default to a 
description of events only. Moreover, in so far as powers of ‘things’ can have 
                                                        
18 See Archer, 2013: pp. 12-13 in Archer, editor, 2013, for elaboration on degrees and types of 
reflexivity see Archer, 2012 
19 See also Donati & Archer, 2015; Gorski, 2013  
20 And the same for morphostatic cycles. 
particular characteristics or qualities that are different in different domains of 
reality (physical and chemical processes, biological processes, human social 
processes etc) then one’s concept of a generative mechanism must be sensitive to 
the error of mapping or conflating from one domain to another. This includes via 
the metaphors one deploys in constructing theory.      
 It is here that Gorski positions his Chapter 2 contribution to Volume 3. 
Gorski argues that none of the ways in which the term generative mechanism is 
currently used in its revival in American sociology are ‘fully realist’. For example, 
the ‘generic approach’ simply uses the term to mean the connections between a 
causal chain. However, the causal chain that is connected remains one of Humean 
constant conjunctions. According to Gorski, the underlying problem is that uses of 
the concept remain restricted by a ‘physicalist imaginery’ rooted in connotations 
of the mechanical. Despite advances in physics and in philosophy – the 
mechanistic reading of mechanism remains subliminally influential, and is 
expressed in a kind of ‘smallism’ or preference for explanation of higher levels in 
terms of lower ones, and a concomitant tendency to focus on the micro (for 
generative mechanisms). Though critical realism formally opposes both, 
according to Gorski it does sometimes lead to the latter. Gorski considers whether 
one might then argue for dispensing with the term generative mechanism in order 
to avoid conflations and confusions within sociology based on its alternative uses. 
However:   
 
[P]roponents of CR and MM should think twice before letting go of the 
mechanisms concept. It has become an important focus of intellectual 
debate, with contending schools attempting to impose their preferred 
definitions on it. There are also important theoretical and political reasons 
not to let it go just yet: the mechanisms concept reminds us that there are 
fairly regular but non-observable processes in the social world, even today. 
For example, however much the technological means of modern capitalism 
have been transformed the inner logic of capital accumulation is not really 
as different as some observers suggest. Nor should the rapidity with which 
capital – and information – now circulate around the globe lead us to 
imagine that these mechanisms and structures have dissolved into 
‘contingencies’ and ‘flows’ whose only properties are ‘risk’ and 
‘acceleration’. Social life is not that fleeting.(Gorski, 2015: p. 43, in Archer 
2015, editor)  
 
It is, therefore, precisely by focusing on what is particular to the social realm that 
the concept of a generative mechanism is justified in that social realm. One must 
be aware of and resist a simple appropriation of meanings based on the 
mechanical or biological. A social order based on human activity cannot be merely 
mechanical in its operation or impersonally automatically selective in the 
biological sense.  
In Chapter 3, Wight also takes up the problem of meaning and notes that 
there is a problem of connotation and inference when using the concept of 
generative mechanism, since ‘the concept of mechanisms was largely developed 
in the context of the physical, not the social sciences. Thus when the term was 
transferred into the social realm it brought with it its implicit and associated 
concepts.’ (Wight, 2015: p. 50, in Archer, editor, 2015). However, when resituated 
in terms of given relationalities, powers and emergence it becomes defendable 
and meaningful in the social realm. Thereafter:  
 
What specific mechanisms govern a particular system is a matter for 
research, not theory, even if theory plays a necessary role in their 
identification and discovery. The only ontological limit on what might be a 
mechanism is that it possesses the powers and liabilities able to produce 
outcomes. (Wight, 2015: p. 54 in Archer, editor, 2015)  
 
Wight then illustrates this point (that generative mechanisms vary by domain and 
that the specific form of them is an empirical issue) based on two ‘interacting’ 
social mechanisms he deems ‘significant in global politics today’, and those are, 
cyber communication and political trust (presumably as instances of Bhaskar’s 
‘hows’). Each can operate on and through given events via technology (and so the 
technology becomes a medium not the mechanism). For Wight, the Occupy 
Movement and Arab Spring are events (in time) significantly affected by and then 
affecting the use and significance of cyber communication and political trust. The 
feedback loops involved have accelerated the use of cyber communication but 
exacerbated the problems of trust. There is, for Wight, a tension here, since the 
form of technology enables communication that does not require prior or 
embedded forms of leadership and representation for protest to be articulated 
and become widespread. At the same time, the disaggregation of the process 
allows protest to proceed rapidly without an alternative programme and without 
any observable cohesion (a different way of considering variety). However, since 
the process is one undertaken reflexively, the limits and tensions are also a 
learning process that may motivate constructive critique, which may call forth 
new democratic forms required to overcome the tensions (as morphogenetic 
elaborations). This, however, is also conditional on wider issues of power, often 
referred to in terms of neo-liberalism, and which also involve the geo-politics of 
the post-Arab Spring (which so far are not propitious for positive fundamental 
change).  
 In Chapter 4, Donati, adds various conceptual caveats regarding the 
potentials of generative mechanisms for morphogenesis based on his 
groundbreaking work on relationality.  For example, he makes the point that the 
internal relational configuration of a mechanism confronts profound issues of 
stability if it involves variety based on self-organization (consider Wight’s point 
regarding cohesion and the Arab Spring).  However, it does not follow that more 
variety within relations renders the relations impossible (the family does not 
simply collapse as an institution because there is now more variability in its 
relations). It can equally be that conformity fails to conserve a relational form 
(since this depends on how conformity is achieved and how it is situated to the 
arising perspectives &c of those within the relations). There is, therefore, great 
scope for many different configurations of relational feedback. An emergent 
relational form may, for example, assimilate, manage and positively support 
variety rather than perpetuate tensions and dichotomies (so there can be quite 
different kinds of ‘regular’ features to different relational forms qua mechanisms 
expressed in M/M cycles).  
Donati’s contribution brings Part 1 to a close and does so by essentially 
making the point that there is nothing intrinsically problematic in a social form 
built on variety, heterogeneity and lack of stasis. This is important, if one returns 
to Archer’s introduction because there is a tendency for the use of such phrases as 
‘variety breeding variety’ to invoke (in a supportive sense) the social theory types 
the contributors are keen to differentiate their work from, and/or to invoke a 
counter-scepticism where any talk of change in these terms simply means chaos 
and so is a non-starter as a way to explore social potential.       
 Part 2 begins with Hofkirchner’s  Chapter 5. Hofkirchner’s focus is on self-
organization as a form of system somewhere between determinate order and 
indeterminate disorder. That is, the form that Donati considers potentially 
problematic. His interest is in contemporary information and communication 
technologies. He makes the important point that reflexivity and the dynamics of 
systems allow not only feedback loops but also feed-forward effects. A ‘logic of the 
third’ is, therefore, possible. That is, current antagonisms within a system can 
become agonisms, where mutuality constructively deescalates the problems of 
difference, as well as the existence of contradictions that arise from different 
interests. There can then be the possibility of synergistic social relations. For 
Hofkirchner, following the theme set out by Wight’s illustration, it is precisely 
because one cannot defend techno-determinism that a range of new possibilities 
arise that may transcend what seem to be disenabling contexts making a 
Morphogenic Society possible). However, for this to be so requires appropriate 
reflexive activity in the feed-forward. In Chapter 6, Lazega takes up this theme 
with a focus on issues of social control that can impede constructive change within 
M/M cycles arising from new technologies in late modernity (enhancing social 
control to some purpose and suppressing positive Morphogenic potentials):   
 
The huge databases that global private actors build today mix network 
profiles, biological data and much more information about individuals and 
collectives. The spread of captors, whether seen as simply amusing or as 
sinister, is part of the increasingly close and efficient standardisation of life 
and current creation of a new social order/control that will separate those 
who conform to dozens of new everyday rules from those who do not. It 
will make access to healthcare and welfare conditional with lifelong 
consequences for individuals and their families, and prove consequential 
for the restructuring of societies… Social digitization – defined here as 
articulation of numerical identity, industrialization/commodification of 
the body and the creation of socio-organizational networks – indeed calls 
for a reaction from public authorities but, in fact, raises key political issues 
of their credibility as enduring counter-powers. (Lazega, 2015: p. 130 in 
Archer, editor, 2015) 
 
Given the particular focus and development of each of these previous chapters the 
reader may begin to experience a cumulative sense that contributors are working 
in different directions. Moreover, one might reasonably infer that some of the 
work seems to reinforce Gorski’s concern that there can be a tendency to focus on 
the ‘micro’ or the particular within the general in realist applications, despite 
reference to systems, and the acknowledgement that broader contexts matter 
(notably a common reference to technology and the digital). However, it is 
important here not to lose sight of the position of each contribution within the 
whole. The illustrations provided are intended to explore particular generative 
mechanisms based on the expertise and interests of the contributor. As examples 
they are not intended to be exhaustive. They illustrate the incompleteness of 
processes and the partiality or differencing within processes. This is one of the 
points Archer attempts to emphasize when referring to M/M cycles located within 
T2  T3.  
In Chapter 7 Archer brings some greater sense of overall perspective to the 
applications. She reprises the overall position she sets out in Volume 1 and 2, but 
does so with an emphasis on agency and ‘double morphogenesis’, defined as ‘how 
groups themselves and group relations are transformed in important respects in 
the course of pursuing and introducing social transformations.’ (Archer, 2015: p. 
138 in Archer editor, 2015). According to Archer, after World War II the developed 
democracies achieved mutual effective regulation between their institutional 
orders and social orders (social democracy, the economy and welfare state with 
attendant effects on the family etc). Though initially morphostatic in its 
consequences, the social form was not one of recognized solidarity where each 
saw the need to shape its interests to the others, but rather remained one of 
managed divergent interests within continued relational contests (to change the 
whole in self-serving ways). Historically two morphogenetic processes then arose 
out of this unstable stasis. First, corporate agency (in the social theory sense) was 
exercised to develop the scope and activity of multinational corporations in their 
productive dimension (reorganization of the use of labour, of legal aspects of 
employment relations, supply chains etc). Concomitantly, corporate agency was 
also exercised to create and extend financialisation of economies (creating a 
further significant context for corporations and the populous). The relative 
success of both has reinforced and extended the influence of the corporate agency 
of both.  
Second, the development of specific technologies and the diffusion of them 
(computerisation, digital applications etc) has tended to contribute to the 
potentials of the first process, but involves two other sets of corporate agents. One 
set, termed digital collaborators are those that work within and on the basis of the 
corporate agency concerns of the first process. The second set, termed digital 
diffusionists tend to set themselves against those concerns – in so far as they 
identify as problematic key aspects of the intrinsic logic of capitalism (the 
assertion of property rights, of a profit motive, of market competition, 
commodification and alienation of and through technology, rather than free 
expression via the same etc.). On the basis that, so far, the digital collaborators 
have dominated, then a cycle characterised by a generative mechanism of digital 
science tied to the logic of capitalism qua the reality of market competition (not 
the idealised abstract ideological form of mainstream economic theory of the 
same) has been unfolding. Its further context (if we refer to Archer’s 3 levels of 
emergence) has been one of declining social integration and of reduced system 
integration.  
For Archer, and with reference to double morphogenesis, the Open Source 
Movement, commons-based peer production, and virtual communities all involve 
corporate agency where diffusionists are contesting the dominance of the other 
corporate agents and reforming their own collective agency as they do so. 
However, the current situation is also one where primary agency for many is being 
increasingly socialised towards passivity. As such, though one may be able to 
speculate regarding some capacities that may facilitate transformation 
(communicative connectivity, the ability to bypass the owned media and to 
organize around social issues and provide political commentary and pressure etc) 
the reasonable conclusion remains that Late Modernity is proving protracted 
(despite its mal-integrations and problems)    
 In Chapter 8 Maccarini expresses this incompleteness based on a slightly 
different emphasis:  
 
The morphogenic logic [variety breeding variety etc] tends to spread, yet 
global society still remains highly differentiated in terms of structural and 
cultural conditions characterizing organizational systems, industrial 
sectors, geographical regions and communities. The same goes for agents 
and groups. As a result there is no social synchrony among the areas of 
global society, not even in the West, despite the ongoing partial 
synchronization of expert systems. Moreover, no homogeneous outcomes 
can be predicted as to the forms the Morphogenic Society will foster or 
hinder. Therefore, the march toward a societal formation we could call 
‘morphogenic’ can be conceived of as a stepwise process, whereby 
mechanisms produce emergent properties and entities, and these 
gradually coalesce to generate new ‘environments’, i.e. ‘parts’ or ‘islands’ 
of society (organizational sectors, inter-institutional complexes, regions 
etc.) (Maccarini, 2015: p. 165 in Archer, editor, 2015).    
 
Though for Maccarini morphogenesis has a logic that tends to ‘seed’ and spread – 
for example, through a growing reliance on reflexivity in social interaction, there 
is clearly some tension here with the recognized passivity of the primary agent. 
Moreover, there is a tension in so far as some kinds of change may qualitatively 
not be changes, or rather may be construed as consequences of mechanism that 
follow established rationales, and so it is questionable as to whether they are 
change to the way things occur or are done. Change may simply be the 
continuation of a tendency that is already inscribed, or it may be a change in the 
internal constituents of a mechanism that still fosters a particular tendency in 
events (so there may be some significant change at a fundamental level that is not 
fundamental in its consequences as change but is fundamental in its consequences 
for lack of significant change). These possibilities bring us to Part 3 of the Volume.           
 In Chapter 9, Porpora considers several cases of morphostasis where one 
might have anticipated change to a tendency, but where change was (or still is) 
significantly delayed. For example, how human societies have continued to be a 
source of global warming based on carbon emissions, despite decades of evidence 
and argument regarding the need for some decisive change in order to prevent a 
worst-case scenario of eco-social disaster. For Porpora all the cases he selects 
share common features – they are extensive across society (or societies), and they 
require collective solutions that involve, for many parties, long-term contextual 
(real?) interests, rather than recognized immediate and close concerns. He argues 
that morphostasis involves mechanisms operative within structure, agency and 
culture. According to Porpora, stasis is facilitated in situations where culture 
produces moral indifference, and this in turn is situated to particular forms of 
social relations. For example, within capitalism, which creates individualised 
interest foci (immediate concerns with wages, households, material goods rather 
than the good etc), which are combined with a sense of disempowerment and a 
‘bystander effect’ (someone else will do x, this is not my responsibility, I am 
incapable of effecting real change to x – a form of ‘learned helplessness’) as well 
as ignorance. Significantly, both structure and culture affect the sense of scope of 
agency and the values that can inform that agency; individualisation, the shrinking 
of our horizon of ultimate concerns to family and household etc. (subject to other 
emotional pulls that are not sustained). On the basis of the cases Porpora states 
that though for:        
 
Critical Realists, structure, culture and agency are all analytically distinct, 
it is nevertheless possible to observe a kind of empirical fusion, in which 
the structure, both directly, and perhaps via the culture, molds the actors 
into certain kinds of agents who come to resonate better with the structure. 
(Porpora, 2015: p. 200 in Archer, editor, 2015) 
 
Morphostasis, therefore, can involve degrees of socialisation of the scope of 
agency, which foster the kinds of passivity of primary agents and interest 
conformity of corporate agents explored by Archer. These can result in changes 
that are changes to stay the same – morphogenesis along trajectories of 
morphostasis. In Chapter 10, Lawson considers similar issues of change to 
enhance an adverse tendency, but does so with a focus on the modern corporation. 
He notes that many critiques of the modern corporation focus on the specific 
socio-economic problems they produce, such as tax avoidance. From the point of 
view of social ontology Lawson takes a step backwards from these manifestations 
to ask: how is a corporation socially positioned and what powers, rights and duties 
(including tensions in the same) follow from this positioning?  He then traces the 
contingent historical development of the corporation to establish how it has 
achieved its current capabilities as a ‘legal person’. According to Lawson the 
corporation is not appropriately constrained in its conduct and has become 
increasingly predatory in its behaviour: 
 
In short, from a shareholder point of view, all doings, including harmful 
ones, are the responsibility of the directors, and in any case the 
shareholders are not liable. From the directors’ point of view, moral 
concerns cannot come into it, because their only (or primary) 
responsibilities are to seek profits to the advantage of the shareholders. 
This is the prevailing ideology. And under its influence the corporate 
juggernaut rolls on. (Lawson, 2015: p. 228 in Archer, editor, 2015)  
 
Lawson’s focus on the corporation illustrates the intensification of a process. In 
the final Chapter 11, Al-Amoudi and Latsis ask how and in what sense do social 
forms die as transformations occur? They introduce the term Morphonecrosis for 
the death process of a social form and make the case that this can be ‘agonistic’ – 
a drawn out struggle. They explore this in terms of different possible constituents 
over which struggle may occur (economic capital, prestige/status of roles etc, 
relational goods, and moral goods) and different methods within which 
contestation may be pursued (the value/meaning/desirability attributed to the 
constituent; the persistence of attendant supportive social institutions etc). For 
Al-Amoudi and Latsis, social forms do not simply definitely die off but rather can 
be reformulated as well as persist as vestiges. 
 Clearly, by Chapter 11 the substance of argument has deviated somewhat 
from a close focus on whether in fact it is possible to claim or identify key 
components for a potential Morphogenic Society. However, the work is not 
irrelevant to that focus. Struggle over what forms the future will take is a core 
aspect of reflexive activity and is redescribable in terms of M/M processes. It is 
not incompatible and adds nuance and range to how one understands the 
concepts and concerns inhering in the temporal sequencing of social interaction 
(recalling M/M is an approach to be applied and to be modified by theory and 
application).          
  
Conclusion 
 
As I have noted, the series based on the ‘From Modernity to Morphogenesis’ 
workshops has a unifying theme, a set of orienting questions, a genuine observed 
empirical set of phenomena to consider, and a further significance as an 
intervention, in so far as the whole is differentiated from an identified 
contemporary tendency to overstate the degree to which we are already living in 
radically new times. Volume 3 (Generative Mechanisms) is a noteworthy set of 
essays within that series. It too has a clear theme and, if read in context, a degree 
of continuity and consistency. Like all edited texts, however, some of the essays 
will be more to the liking of some readers than others, since each is also written 
based on given interests and concerns, and these will resonate with those of 
readers. Personally, I found Archer’s essay useful because it provided context for 
the others (and might better be read first after the introduction to allow the reader 
to see how the others connect). Thereafter, I found Porpora, Lawson and then Al-
Amoudi and Latsis’ essays most interesting: Porpora’s for its clarity in regard of 
distinguishable macro mechanisms, but integrated (or messy) approach to 
empirical matters, explored through the centrality of agency effects in a series of 
well-chosen cases; Lawson’s for its focus on underlying explanatory approaches 
to a significant contemporary problem I have an interest in (tax avoidance), and 
Al-Amoudi and Latsis’s for the concept of morphonecrosis, which made me think 
about a recognized issue in a different way.    
 As a final comment, I would note that the series so far has provided many 
reasons why one would be sceptical regarding the emergence of a Morphogenic 
Society, and also many reasons why one cannot easily conceptualise such a society 
(though one can make normative claims regarding the qualities one would desire 
in such a society). In a certain sense, the series so far, including Volume 3, is doing 
exactly what it set out to do. For a reader, however, used to more determinate 
claims (even when the form of claim is about the indeterminacy of the 
contemporary world), this can be an unsettling experience. Again, this is a matter 
of expectation.  
It is also important to bear in mind that this series is not alone in seeking a 
more nuanced and sceptical approach to the nature and status of change within 
the contemporary world.  For example, Jamie Peck and his various collaborators 
have developed a version of the theory of neoliberalism that has many of the same 
goals and caveats.21 Their work is written from within urban geography and also 
political economy, and the language used is not as sharply focused via ontology, 
                                                        
21 See Peck, 2013; Brenner et al, 2010 
but there is still a family resemblance in terms of motivating concerns and 
findings. Work by Peck and others might productively be read in conjunction with 
Archer et al, not least because doing so addresses some of the concerns regarding 
the macro political economy aspects of sociology, social theory and social ontology 
(Lawson’s involvement not withstanding) that have been raised by Jonathan 
Joseph.22 Concomitantly, Joseph notes that new forms of reflexivity are products 
of neoliberal governance (they are its normal), and the concept of Morphogenic 
Society is highly generalised, and so may lack traction in terms of particular 
meaning.   
Though Joseph’s points are not mendacious, and make sense in terms of his 
own work on governmentality, it is not entirely clear they are actually criticisms.23 
One might equally state that part of the point of using the M/M approach is to 
highlight the emergence and proliferation of reflexivity qua change etc (so what 
else could this be than, if translated into historical narrative, a product of the 
contemporary social forms - whatever appellation we then choose to attach to that 
form)? At the same time, the purpose of the project is to explore potential based 
on characteristics that are not necessarily reducible to, or then restricted within, 
the historical form in which they are instantiated. (Meta) reflexivity is not tied to 
neoliberalism only and the contestations within neoliberalism, including through 
meta-reflexivity, may ultimately change the nature of that social form. Relatedly, 
Morphogenic Society is by intent a generic that may take more specific forms, in 
so far as the contemporary world experiences changes (a possible 
transformation). From Archer’s point of view traction is provided by specification 
based on what occurs and not by the mere existence of the general concept. 
According to Archer and the other contributors, there is as yet no identifiable 
Morphogenic Society, merely incomplete M/M cycles of particular kinds. So in a 
quite different sense to that intended by Joseph Morphogenic Society could mean 
many things or ultimately nothing at all. This is yet to be decided. At the moment 
the best one can do is read the work and consider the potentials. Perhaps at some 
later date this series will be seen as a landmark in early discussion of that Society.  
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